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Truncating a Disease. The Reduction of Silica
Hazards to Silicosis at the 1930 International
Labor Ofﬁce Conference on Silicosis in
Johannesburg
PA Rosental1,2,3,4
The current nosology and etiology of silicosis were ofﬁcially adopted by the 1930
International Labor Ofﬁce (ILO) Conference on silicosis in Johannesburg. Convened by
the International Labor Ofﬁce and by the Transvaal Chamber of Mines, it paved the way to
the adoption of a 1934 ILO convention which recognized silicosis as an occupational
disease. Even though it constituted a social and sanitary turning point, the Johannesburg
conference, strongly inﬂuenced by South African physicians working for the gold mining
industry, reduced silica hazards to silicosis, an equation which is questioned nowadays.
While the deﬁnition of silicosis adopted in 1930 was a major step in the recognition of
occupational pneumoconioses, it also led to the under-identiﬁcation of some pathogenic
effects of silica. Going back to history opens new avenues for contemporary medical
research. Am. J. Ind. Med. 58:S6–S14, 2015.  2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
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INTRODUCTION
To a large extent, silicosis as we know it today is an
illness whose nosology and etiology were deﬁned in 1930 at
the International Labor Ofﬁce (ILO) Conference on silicosis
in Johannesburg. Not that the knowledge about this
pathology suddenly formed on this occasion: rather, the
conference contributed to negotiating minimum agreement
on the conclusions of previous work often going back several
decades. The conference also paved the way for the adoption
of the 1934 ILO convention on silicosis, which triggered
its ofﬁcial recognition as an occupational disease (and,
therefore, its ﬁnancial compensation) in several industrial-
ized countries. The conclusions of the conference, which
were voted by the medical delegates, shaped the deﬁnition of
the disease, with consequences that continue to inﬂuence
contemporary medical knowledge.
A crucial point of the present article is to show how the
history of the recognition of the disease informs current
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medical issues. The Johannesburg conference reduced silica
hazards to silicosis, an equation which was due to last for
decades, but which is increasingly questioned today.
“Reduction” needs to be taken here in the literal meaning
of the word: a major outcome of the conference was that its
delegates voted the transformation of silicosis from a 5-stage
to a 3-stage disease. While the deﬁnition of silicosis adopted
in 1930 was a major step in the recognition of occupational
pneumoconioses, one may argue that it also led to the under-
identiﬁcation of some pathogenic effects of silica.
This process highlights the role played by employers’
medical experts, in particular South African physicians
working for the gold mining industry, in the deﬁnition of
silicosis. Another aspect of this paper is to explain why and
how a “social” transnational institution, the ILO, and an
employers’ organization, the Transvaal Chamber of Mines,
cooperated in working towards the recognition of an
occupational disease.
In 1838, by proposing the term “anthracosis” to
designate the illness caused by the inhalation of coal dust,
the Englishman Thomas Stratton was the ﬁrst to recognize
the etiological role of an inorganic dust in a speciﬁc
pathology [Heppleston, 1992; Meiklejohn, 1959]. However,
his hypothesis was challenged, and mineral dust only really
started to be considered an etiological factor in the 1860s. In
1867 the German anatomopathologist Friedrich Albert von
Zenker (1825–1898) used a comparison of anthracosis and
“siderosis” (a term he created to designate the pathology
linked to exposure to iron particles) as a springboard to create
the term “pneumoconioses” [von Zenker, 1867]. Four years
later, the Milanese doctor Achile Visconti used the term
“silicosis” for the ﬁrst time in the death records of his hospital
[Rovida, 1871].
This profusion of terms ﬂowed from the growth and
increasing accuracy of anatomopathological and experimen-
tal observations in the mid-19th century [Carozzi, 1941–
1942; Rosen, 1943; Meiklejohn, 1951–1952]. But it also
reﬂected extra-medical developments. The occupational
diseases of workers were of increasing interest to public
authorities, employers, and industrial hygienists: as the
number of diseases increased with industrialization, they
started interfering with the productivity of workers, and
particularly skilled workers. By mobilizing doctors with
different know-how the commissions (administrative, par-
liamentary, consular, academic) focused on this issue created
a fuller and de-compartmentalized medical approach, which
had previously divided diseases by trade.
Another driver of change was the political and union
pressure exercised by the labor movement beginning in the last
decades of the 19th century: labor law and social protections
emerged in Europe to counter the risk of revolution. In the area
of occupational health, this dynamic led to the medico-legal
notion of “occupational diseases” granting the right to
compensation. However, a particular development prevented
pneumoconioses from joining this category right away: the
identiﬁcation of Koch’s bacillus in 1882. It allowed employers’
experts to attribute these diseases to the workers’ living
conditions and thereby relieve companies of the obligation to
provide ﬁnancial compensation.
This tension explains why scientiﬁc developments alone
did not sufﬁce to establish silicosis as a speciﬁc disease, even
though silicosis was the subject of a comprehensive Milroy
Lecture by the great British industrial hygienist Edgar Leigh
Collis in 1915 [Collis, 1915]. As a medical inspector of
factories with the Home Ofﬁce, he combined ﬁeld
knowledge, experimental statistics and radiographic data
to create an analytical framework that remains mostly
relevant. It served as the basis for the United Kingdom’s
recognition of silicosis as an occupational disease in 1918.
But this formalization was limited, since it did not spread to
Europe or the United States; even in Great Britain the mining
sector was excluded!
Nowhere were the industrial and medical stakes so
tightly imbricated as in South Africa, where silicosis
decimated the workforce as soon as the gold mines started
to be exploited in the last two decades of the 19th century
[Katz, 1994]. Due to diplomatic pressure after 1900 from the
United Kingdom, whose emigrant miners from Cornwall
were struck by the disease, and to economic rationale
mediated by a strong racial divide between (White) miners
and (Black) “laborers” (who comprised about 90% of the
workforce), South Africa soon became a pioneering country
on silicosis issues. This was expressed in terms of medical
expertise, sanitary monitoring and ﬁnancial compensation,
as objectiﬁed by a series of annual reports starting in 1912
[Union of South Africa, 1912].
However, the medical deﬁnition of silicosis could not be
settled without the establishment of an economic and
political consensus. The South African gold mining industry
was central in this process. But in order to impose it
internationally, it had to cooperate with a transnational entity,
the International Labor Ofﬁce.
WHY JOHANNESBURG?
The two partners which organized and jointly funded the
Johannesburg conference, formalized its agenda and pro-
gramme, and determined its list of participants—foreign
medical experts who were selected in consultation with their
respective governments—were the ILO on the one hand and
the Transvaal Chamber of Mines on the other.
In a previous publication I had the opportunity to
analyze the ILO’s motivations [Cayet et al., 2009]. Instituted
in 1919 by the Treaty of Versailles to develop social
protections and labor law, this international organization
created an Industrial Hygiene Section (IHS) in 1920 that was
placed under the leadership of the great Italian social doctor
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Luigi Carozzi (1880–1963) [Carnevale and Baldasseroni,
1999]. Since then the ILO’s mission has been to convince
states to vote on and ratify international conventions through
tripartite negotiations between governments, employers and
unions. In 1925 it secured the adoption of a ﬁrst international
agreement on occupational health, “Convention C18
concerning workmen’s compensation for occupational
diseases”. Notwithstanding the pressure from certain
international labor organizations, silicosis was not included.
Carozzi was a leading proponent of covering this disease, the
“king of occupational diseases” [McCord, 1940] of his time,
but he deemed there was insufﬁcient consensus on it in
the medical community. The IHS director decided to use his
channels of inﬂuence to advance research and discussion
on silicosis, but his budgetary allocation was limited. Thus,
he embraced a proposal by William Gemmill, secretary of
the Transvaal Chamber of Mines, to co-fund a congress that
would take place in Johannesburg.
In Johannesburg, the Rand Mines’ Superintendent
of Sanitation, Alexander J. Orenstein (1879–1972), was
Carozzi’s direct partner in organizing the conference. The
two men followed the ILO’s usual process. On the one hand,
they needed to select renowned international experts
representing a wide range of views, without running the
risk of systematic obstruction. French experts, who denied
the very existence of silicosis, were therefore excluded from
the conference [Devinck and Rosental, 2009; Geerkens,
2009]. On the other hand, they ﬁrst had to secure agreement
from the governments concerned: the ILO failed, for
instance, to secure that of the United Kingdom to send
Edgar Collis, even though he was a major expert on the issue.
Finally, Carozzi and Orenstein created a speciﬁc agenda,
reﬂected in a questionnaire sent to experts before the
conference: the latter were asked to deﬁne the nosology and
etiology of the disease, and to lay the medical basis for its
prevention and ﬁnancial compensation.
What interest would an employers’ organization have in
working towards the recognition of an occupational disease?
This is the crucial question here, because it determined the
conclusions of the conference. In 1930, South African
medicine dominated global research on silicosis. Since this
country was the ﬁrst, in 1912, to implement a compensation
system for the disease, along with medical monitoring of the
workforce, South African doctors had thousands of X-rays of
the disease at a time when these were the most reliable tool
for early detection.
The Australian historian Jock McCulloch has shown
that one of the purposes of the Johannesburg conference–
for the ILO, the ﬁrst held outside of Europe—was to
display South Africa’s medical and “social” superiority at
the global level, with a view to maintaining the supply
ﬂows of miners coming from all of Southern Africa, and
especially from the Portuguese and British colonial
empires [McCulloch, 2012]. But various other reasons,
which have been neglected by historiography, were
determining as well. Despite its medical and engineering
know-how (pioneering use of humidiﬁcation and ventila-
tion in the mines), South Africa also needed international
expertise, both to legitimize some of the choices it had
made, and to improve them through comparison with the
experience of other countries. Here, medical concerns—the
explicit focus of the conference—were not paramount, as
they were accompanied by utilitarian concerns about
optimizing the management of personnel and of social
protections with respect to the risk of silicosis.
This objective was sometimes expressed directly in the
conference proceedings. On the subject of humidiﬁcation for
example, Louis G. Irvine, Chairman of the Miners’ Phthisis
Medical Bureau, explicitly drew on the experience of other
countries to advance the quest for optimal dosage: “We
realize that although water will take one a large part of the
way [. . .] its use has certain positive disadvantages both
hygienic and economic. Hence theminds ofmedical men and
engineers are turning today to the question: have we not been
overdoing water? Could we not do better with less water,
and a greater extension of alternative methods?” [ILO, 1930
p. 22].
But most often, the South African agenda was
formulated in a partial and indirect way. Piecing it back
together involves working from the fragments disseminated
throughout the conference proceedings and the attendant
expert reports. These reveal a great managerial unity that
explains the Transvaal Chamber of Mines’ investment in the
conference.
The general objective was formulated by Anthony E.
Mavrogordato (1874–1944), a British physiologist employed
by the South African Institute for Medical Research
[O’Connor, 1991, p. 118-119]: it was to delay as much as
possible the appearance of clinical manifestations of silicosis
likely to diminish the productivity of workers; the doctors
who divided the disease into stages called this “ante-primary
silicosis”. Thanks to the prevention policy in place since the
beginning of the century, Mavrogordato speciﬁed, entering
this phase “now takes thirteen years instead of eight to nine
years [. . .]. If the time taken to produce a clinical silicosis
could be pushed up to twenty years, silicosis could be
considered as eliminated on the Rand from the social point of
view” [ILO, 1930, p. 79]. In other words, in parallel with the
evolution of medical knowledge at the time [Weisz, 2014],
the priority of the Johannesburg conference was to cast
silicosis as a chronic disease of long latency.
This objective required the coordination of medical
experts at the international level because it faced several
hurdles. One of the thorniest obstacles was the erratic
progression of the disease: “the “injury” inﬂicted is in the
majority of cases not a stationary one, but one which tends to
get worse, yet which does so very erratically and in general
over a period of a good many years” (Irvine in ILO, 1930, p.
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25). Unpredictability was reﬂected in both the “wide
individual variations” [Irvine et al., 1930, p. 252] and the
difﬁculty in correlating the three approaches to diagnosing
the course of the disease: pathological, radiological, and
clinical. This difﬁculty is crucial because it thwarted the
desire—which was common in medicine at the time—to
deﬁnitively delineate the “stages” of development of
silicosis. Even though the South African Medical Bureau
“has been able to carry out such a correlation in a series of
400 cases”, it sought to compare these with studies conducted
elsewhere, particularly by Leroy U. Gardner, director of
Saranac Laboratories in the United States, and Edgar H.
Kettle, Professor of Pathology at the University of London.
Another priority important worldwide was to understand
the interplay between silicosis and tuberculosis. While
“denier” countries like France and Belgium considered
silicosis to be a complication of tuberculosis (and therefore a
disease that did not qualify for compensation from employ-
ers), the South Africans believed the former was conducive
to triggering the latter as a result of allergic1 or toxic2
mechanisms.
Regardless of their importance, it would be artiﬁcial to
completely separate these medical questions from labor
management issues. While the former have a certain
autonomy linked to the disease’s great nosological complexi-
ty, they only really take on signiﬁcance in view of managerial
concerns. While the Johannesburg conference deliberately
emphasized the medical aspect of silicosis (rather than
engineering, for example), economic and ﬁnancial concerns
were actually omnipresent. We noted the adjective Mavro-
gordato used to describe the desire to push back the onset of
the disease by several years: he believed such progress would
resolve the issue of silicosis “from the social point of view”,
whereas today we would consider this improvement to be an
economic advantage for employers seeking to keep their
skilled workforce active, while miners were condemned to a
dreaded and incurable disease.
However, the conference took place at a time when
social insurance systems around the world were developing
in line with a model that combined economic utilitarianism
with social and health concerns: growth in economic
productivity was supposed to be the best way to improve
workers’ living standards, while social and medical
protection was in turn supposed to “improve” the
workforce [Cayet and Rosental, 2013; Fontaine, 2014].
The inaugural speech by Edward Joseph Phelan
(1888–1967), who was then Chief of the Diplomatic
Division of the ILO, illustrates this alliance: he under-
scored “the enormous burden which the [South African]
industry has to bear of nearly £1,000,000 per annum”, by
joining in the same sentence “the suffering to the victims
and loss to the industry” [ILO, 1930, p. 14]. The problem
was compounded by the status of the material extracted
from the mines: given that gold was the ultimate reserve
asset of the monetary system, its price could not be
adjusted to reﬂect the cost of compensating miners. This
constraint affected the whole industry, but it was especially
severe in a country with dozens of mining companies,
where it “may make the difference as to whether a low-
grade mine may run at a proﬁt or not”, as a South African
insurer put it [Watt in ILO, 1930, p. 595].
It is therefore important to return to the precedence of
South African measures: how was this country able to force
the Transvaal’s powerful goldmines to compensate silicosis
victims as early as 1912, and accept successive legislative
reviews increasing beneﬁts for miners? In comparison, in
1930 silicosis was not yet recognized as an occupational
disease in either France or Belgium. In the United Kingdom,
coalmines were exempted from the silicosis compensation
provided for in the 1918 Workers’ Compensation Act.
Financial compensation for this disease was only required
in a 1928 law, but the conditions for miners to qualify were
such that they considerably reduced the extent of recognition.
The ﬁrst South African measures were initially a
response to political and media pressure from the United
Kingdom, whose miners employed in South Africa
experienced high and rapid mortality. Their replacement
by Afrikaner miners did not provide any respite. As
members of strong unions, the latter were able to push for
social and health measures. Moreover, in line with the
conventional wisdom of the time, the government hoped
that the establishment of a compensation system would
force mining companies “to stimulate prophylactic meas-
ures” (Orenstein in ILO, 1930, p. 85). Another consider-
ation also played a decisive role. In a still rural country
where retraining options were limited, miners afﬂicted with
silicosis were tempted to remain active as long as possible
to maintain their standard of living. One of the doctors even
recognized that it was difﬁcult to distinguish between the
health risk of slowly contracting silicosis and of falling into
great poverty. This dialectic created health risks in the
mining workforce (increased risk of contracting and
spreading tuberculosis) and economic risks (decreased
productivity). Financial compensation was established in
response to this threat: it stipulated that the compensated
miner would leave his employment.
As compensation improved throughout the 1920s, South
Africa came to face an increasingly acute dilemma:
1 “How the silica acts in inﬂuencing the growth of the tubercle bacillus is
still unknown, but it appears likely that it is a metabolic phenomenon [. . .].
One problem is to ﬁnd out whether silica rock, like certain other inorganic
material, set up an allergic state in the tissues and whether tissues which
are allergic to silica are also allergic to tubercle” [Mavrogordato in ILO,
1930, p. 45].
2 “As has been shown in particular by Gye and Kettle, ﬁnely divided silica
acts as a soluble cell poison and has in consequence a speciﬁc effect in
determining the selection by a tuberculous infection of sites where silica is
aggregated” [Irvine in ILO, 1930, p. 23].
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increasing social costs or decreasing economic productivity.
The terms of this dilemma were explicitly stated during the
conference: “on the one hand, if silicotics were allowed to
remain in their underground occupations without any
restrictions, the position might be reached after a period of
years when the goldmining industry would be entirely run by
employees who are silicotics and this in the end is bound to
affect efﬁciency. On the other hand, no State can be expected
to legalize what amounts to slow suicide” [AB Du Toit
(Chairman of the Miners’ Phthisis Board) in ILO, 1930,
p. 82].
For this reason South African experts hoped that the
conference would help them to better link clinical,
pathological and radiological evaluations into a deﬁnitive
assessment of the evolution of silicosis: so long as
the management of workforce ﬂows ran up against the
uncontrollable variety of single cases, they could not know at
what moment in the lifecycle afﬂicted miners should be
removed. This debate was the source of a spectacular conﬂict
that played out within the South African delegation
throughout the conference. Louis G. Irvine, who led the
Miners’ Phthisis Medical Bureau that was responsible for
silicosis compensation, called for continuing the prevention
policy pursued over the previous twenty years. In his opinion
the policy had reduced the number of “ante-primary cases”
and could continue to improve results. However, he butted
heads with Orenstein, who by virtue of his ofﬁce reasoned
both in medical terms and in terms of optimizing workforce
management. By citing foreign experts to buttress his
argument, he denied the progress made and went as far as
casting doubt on the accuracy of mining statistics3 and
challenging the very possibility of health improvement with
respect to silicosis: “The Reporters may consider whether
silicosis can be called preventable. It is a misconception that
removal from work in the earliest possible stage would
prevent further development; if it was true that continued
employment was really slow suicide, no man should be
allowed to work in any dusty occupation at all”. He
condemned the very principle of legislation on pneumoconi-
osis, which cost a lot, reduced the workforce, and condemned
sick miners to poverty: “under the present system in the ante-
primary stage of silicosis a man is penalized if he did not
leave the mine at once, and about £500 is given to a man thus
thrown out of employment. It might be better to wait until a
marked degree of incapacity was reached and that search
should be made for other avenues of employment”
[Orenstein in ILO, 1930, p. 78].
Indeed, Orenstein blamed the insurance schemes in
place for the loss of skilled workers who had to stop working
in the mines after receiving compensation, even though, he
maintained, this removal did not protect them from silicosis’
irreversible progression. Rather than touting the merits of the
South African social health organization, he deemed it
necessary to recognize its limitations and propose an
alternative policy, to which the social insurance’s budget
would be reallocated: “the money now set aside for
compensating cases of the disease might be better spent
upon rehabilitation methods”. Despite its stated medical
goal, the agenda of the Johannesburg conference was shaped
by South Africa’s bitter internal conﬂict between an
approach based on workforce management and one based
on managing social insurance. These issues are key to
understanding the legacy of this meeting.
JOHANNESBURG’S LEGACY
As I have stated earlier, even if the Johannesburg
conference did not produce a revolution in medical
knowledge, it is justiﬁably considered a turning point in
the history of the recognition of silicosis as an occupational
disease. First of all, the adopted medical resolutions deﬁned
the pathology: “Silicosis is a pathological condition of the
lungs due to inhalation of silicon dioxide. It can be produced
experimentally in animals” [ILO, 1930, p. 86, 2nd medical
resolution]. They also dispelled the idea that silicosis was
simply a complication of tuberculosis by emphasizing how
the latter exacerbates the effects of the former: “infection of
the lung with B. tuberculosis or other pathogenic organisms,
whether it occurs before, simultaneously with, or subsequent
to the development of silicosis, alters the disease and
inﬂuences it unfavorably, tuberculous infection being
particularly unfavorable” [ILO, 1930, p. 87, 6th medical
resolution]. This was a decisive point because it paved the
way for a medical-legal recognition of silicosis as an
occupational disease at the international level.
To a large extent the conference also advanced one of its
key priorities, viz. to link clinical, anatomo-pathological, and
radiographic approaches to the disease.4 This was the basis
for deﬁning silicosis as a disease progressing in three distinct
stages: “In the ‘ﬁrst stage” symptoms referable to the
respiratory system may be either slight or even absent.
Capacity for work may be slightly impaired. There may be a
departure from the normal in percussion and in auscultatory
signs, and the radiograph must show an increased density of
linear shadows, and the presence of discrete shadows,
3 Reported as: “The present statistics were perfectly reliable, but did not
reﬂect the whole picture. It was impossible to say whether the real
production of silicosis was more or less than that shown by the ﬁgures
[. . .]. The statistical methods of the Rand were not sufﬁcient to give the
facts which practical hygienists wished to know. [They] did not give the
fundamental data and he was not satisﬁed that they demonstrated a
reduction in silicosis” [Orenstein in ILO, 1930, p. 78 and p. 80].
4 Note by Luigi Carozzi to Harold Butler and Fernand Maurette, 10
February 1933, ILO Archives, Geneva, HY 1000/50/1.
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indicative of nodulation. In the “second stage”, there is an
increase of the physical signs observable in the “ﬁrst stage”,
and the radiograph shows an increase in the number and size
of the discrete shadows indicative of nodulation with a
tendency to their conﬂuence. There must be some degree of
deﬁnite impairment of working capacity. In the “third stage”
all the above conditions are grossly accentuated and
indications of areas of massive ﬁbrosis are usual. There is
serious or total incapacitation” [ILO, 1930, p. 88, 18th to
20th medical resolution].
This nosology became the foundation of international
medical comparisons, national laws, the implementation of
compensation and, beginning in 1958, the establishment of
international radiographic standards. The health improvements
it brought werewell summarized by FrancescoCarnevale, who
is both a medical inspector in the workplace and a historian of
occupational health: “reducing exposure to silica and in general
to dusts, [. . .] gradual and partial prevention measures
introduced at different times and different ways in diverse
industrial sectors (always seeking the economic compatibility
of the process), produced a metamorphosis of the disease,
whichbecame “chronic”, less speciﬁc, andwithgreater survival
rates” [Carnevale, 2013, p. 112].
At the same time, ILO archives shed light on the
conference’s limitations even from the perspective of the
organizers. Indeed, in the ensuing years Carozzi and
Orenstein worked to ensure international recognition of
silicosis. The notes they exchanged helped themmake a lucid
assessment. From their perspective, the Johannesburg
Conference did not really succeed in creating a clear and
consensual medical basis for an international convention.
“All we should aim at”, Carozzi wrote two years later, “is to
secure that silicosis in whatever form and however deﬁned
should be recognized as an industrial disease for which
compensation is payable. If this principle was established, it
might well be left to the individual countries to deﬁne the
disease”.5 This realistic position, while remaining true to the
ILO’s spirit of compromise, led to a very particular
recognition of silicosis in an international convention that
was ﬁnally passed in 1934. While the other occupational
diseases were deﬁned by exposure to a substance or work
process, the silicosis risk was formulated in a completely
circular way: it covered workers employed in “industries or
processes recognized by national law or regulations as
involving exposure to the risk of silicosis” [ILO, 1934]. This
criterion can be compared to that used for phosphorous
poisoning, for example, in the same convention: “any
process involving the production, liberation, or utilization of
phosphorous, or its compounds”. This caution can be
explained by the ILO’s general policy aiming to protect
workers from dismissal by the courts by refusing to
recognize a disease over which full medical agreement
had not yet been achieved.6 The conclusions of the
Johannesburg conference were not as decisive as interna-
tional union pressure in pushing for the recognition of the
most serious of occupational diseases: according to A.J.
Orenstein, the new Deputy Director of the ILO, Harold
Butler, “felt strongly” in 1932 that it “had not so far resulted
in any very important information on the subject being
acquired”.7
Luigi Carozzi was also under no illusions about the
classiﬁcation of the disease into three stages, which became
the basis of medical and radiological knowledge and of
victim compensation for decades: “the adoption of the three
stages represents merely a somewhat arbitrary classiﬁcation,
commonly adopted by medical experts on the subject,
exclusively in regard however to clinical study of silicosis
and with a view to clinical, radiological, and anatomo-
pathological correlation of ﬁndings; such a classiﬁcation has
nothing whatever to do with compensation, in regard to
which the only element to be considered is reduction of
earning capacity or working capacity. To be convinced of the
above it sufﬁces to refer to the ILO Draft convention which
takes no account whatsoever of any such division or stages”.8
Indeed, several major questions remained unanswered
by the great experts of the time. The conference did not revise
the disease’s triggering mechanism at all—even in general
terms—thus hampering any prevention worthy of the name:
“in the case of pneumoconiosis in general, and silicosis in
particular, it is not so far known what is the dust content
below which the system remains immune from attack by
silicosis, nor what is of even greater importance, the size
frequency of particles which constitute the harmful element
in the dust”.9Several decades later, it is still unclear whether
this puzzle has been solved. As stated by Catinon and
Chemarin [2013, p. 101], “many of the hypotheses put
forward at the conference still have not been tested [. . .].
Silica or asbestos carcinogenesis and ﬁbrogenesis processes
have not still been elucidated”.
5 L. Carozzi, Internal Note, 15 June 1932, ILO Archives, Geneva, HY
1000/50/1.
6 The ILO, “in agreement with its medical experts, considers that it is
impossible to propose a system of compensation resting on a sure and
solid basis without being able to deﬁne the condition and to recognize the
deﬁnition. To obviate disputes in the courts it is essential that legislation
should be substantially deﬁnite to preclude all doubt as to the deﬁnition of
the disease, or at least to permit of the least possible doubt, such deﬁnition
being accepted by the majority of authorities on the subject” (Luigi
Carozzi, Note on a letter from Verne A. Zimmer from the Division of
Labor Standards of the USDepartment of Labor, ILOArchives, HY 1000/
34/2).
7 Talk by Orenstein at the Special meeting of the Medical Research
Council’s Committee on Industrial Pulmonary Diseases, London, 27 July
1932, ILO Archives, Geneva, HY 1000/50/1.
8 L. Carozzi, Note on a letter from Verne A. Zimmer, op. cit.
9 Ibid.
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Second, not only was the correlation between these
different approaches to the disease imperfect, but the most
reliable detection tool—radiology—presented uncertain-
ties. Even A.J. Orenstein, who is probably one of the
doctors who by virtue of his position had access to the
greatest number of X-rays, recognized that “the question
of a correct diagnosis, not only clinically but also post
mortem, is presenting difﬁculties as the work progresses
and workers in “new” industries are investigated. The
abrasive powder workers and certain colliery workers are
instances. I saw the lungs and microscopic preparations
from some of these, and it would indeed be almost
impossible to say whether one looked at true silicosis or
chronic tuberculosis [. . .]. It seems to me hopeless to
attempt any international convention on this matter until
we can deﬁnitely say what is silicosis and by which dusts
it is produced [. . .]. In South Africa they do know what
silicosis is. But, and it is a very big “but”, I now think, we
only know our silicosis, and I am afraid there are quite a
number of other varieties”10.
The fact that Orenstein’s misgivings focused on
workers employed in the abrasive powder sector is
particularly interesting: given the very large concentration
of quartz, which can account for up to 90% of the product,
exposure to silica in this sector can cause an acute rather
than chronic illness. Yet the risks linked to intense but
short-term exposure to silica were left out of the confer-
ence’s agenda and resolutions. Black miners, labelled as
“laborers”, who were the vast majority of the workforce in
South African gold mines, were recruited for the most
dangerous positions and experienced a rapid turnover,
which doctors claimed would protect them. The racial
management of South African workers and, more general-
ly, the dual management of mining labor in the world (with
the vulnerable population such as immigrant workers or
political or war prisoners being at highest risk) played a
decisive role in establishing and maintaining silicosis as a
chronic disease, or one could even say a lifecycle disease.
Several articles in this issue delve into the con-
sequences of this choice [Blanc, 2015; Vincent et al.,
2015]. In conclusion, I would like to underscore the
epistemological coup achieved in Johannesburg, for better
or worse. Following the conference, the global classiﬁca-
tion in three stages that became the hallmark of silicosis,
spread throughout the world. As we have seen, this
disease is deﬁned as ﬁbrotic in its ﬁrst stage. But a careful
reading of the conference’s medical resolutions reveals a
more complex and surprising dynamic.
In the conference’s conclusions, the famous three
phases are not coded a, b and c, but c, d, and e [ILO, 1930,
p. 88, 9th medical resolution]. After stipulating that “the
disease can conveniently be divided into three stages”, the
16th resolution even took care to note that they could be
“designated “ﬁrst”, “second”, and “third” stages” [ILO,
1930, p. 88]. Specifying this was not tautological; rather,
it was pivotal. Medically, the conference discussed an
illness in ﬁve stages. But the 9th medical resolution
simply decided to exclude the ﬁrst two phases from the
characterization of silicosis. The ﬁrst one, labelled “a”,
designated “a dry bronchiolitis, characterized by an
accumulation of dust ﬁlled phagocytes in or in relation
to the terminal bronchioles, with possibly some desqua-
mation of their epithelium”. The second one, named “b”,
concerned “the accumulation of dust-containing phago-
cytes about and in the intra-pulmonary lymphoid tissue,
and their transportation through the lymphatics into the
tracheo-bronchial lymph nodes”. The resolution took care
to note that “the conditions described above under (a) and
(b) do not constitute the disease silicosis”. This is the
reason why the “ﬁrst” stage of silicosis is labelled c. . .
We can speak of a coup because this truncation of the
disease was far from having a purely medical basis. It
reﬂected the state of South Africa’s silicosis compensa-
tion, which began at the third stage—relabelled as the ﬁrst
stage: “it was suggested that, for purposes of compensa-
tion, cases should be divided into three stages: early,
intermediate and advanced, and that for the two latter a
pension or annuity should be payable”. In the Miners’
Phthisis Act of 1916 “the two “stages” had been termed
“primary” and “secondary”. The interpretation given to
the deﬁnition of the “primary” stage by the legal advisers
of the Crown was that it should be held to include only
such cases as showed some amount of disability; an
interpretation in conformity with the general usage
regarding cases of industrial “injury” [Irvine et al.,
1930, p. 188 and p. 195]. In other words, one of the
functions of the Johannesburg conference was to ensure
the transposition into medicine and international medico-
legal measures of the legal criteria for silicosis compen-
sation in South Africa. This effort was no secret at the
time. Indeed, Italian representative Giovanni Loriga,
Chief Medical Inspector of Factories, “dissented from
the proposal [. . .] on the ground that these notes should
properly be inserted in the Report on Compensation, since
arbitrary legal limits might be laid down between the
various pathological stages, while pathology must insist
on the progressive nature of the evolution of the disease
and could not properly indicate hard and fast divisions
between its different stages” [Loriga in ILO, 1930, p. 93].
Even though Irvine had acknowledged during discus-
sions that “the question of what is happening in the lung and
respiratory passages during the long period of exposure prior
to the development of actual silicosis [phases (a) and (b)]
requires further investigation, both experimental and by
10 Letter from A.J. Orenstein to L. Carozzi, 10 June 1932, ILO Archives,
Geneva, HY 1000/50/1.
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observation in the human subject” [Irvine in ILO, 1930,
p. 59], the coup of 1930 would profoundly shape the
subsequent medical debate. Once silicosis was deﬁned as
both the silica disease and as a ﬁbrotic disease, any other
possible pathogenic manifestation of exposure to silica fell
outside of the scope of medical investigation, except for
tuberculosis whose intimate relationship with silicosis was
still recognized. Aside from recurrent but isolated questions
on the role of silica [Collis and Yule, 1933; Vigliani and
Pernis, 1963], only the evolution of detection tools in the past
thirty years (with the scanner and then bronchoalveolar
lavage), and the sarcoidosis (or “sarcoid-like disease”)
“epidemic” in the aftermath of the September 11 tragedy,
reopened the debate [Jordan et al., 2011; Crowley et al.,
2011]. To return to the source of codiﬁcation of silicosis in
1930 is a way to contribute to contemporarymedical research
on the topic. The present issue explores this novel interaction
between history and medicine.
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